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Playing Favorites?
Justice Scalia, Abortion Protests, and
Judicial Impartiality
Daniel A. Farber

†

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously identified a
foundational commitment of First Amendment law as “the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree
1
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”
2
In a series of cases involving abortion protesters, Justice
Scalia accused the majority of the Court of breaching that
fundamental constitutional commitment. He charged the Court
with blatantly flouting existing doctrine in cases involving
3
abortion protests —and doing so because of bias against the
views of abortion protesters. In a 1994 case, he said that the
lower court decision “departs so far from the established course
of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have
been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal”—“[b]ut
4
the context here is abortion.” Twenty years later he repeated
the same refrain: “Today’s opinion carries forward this Court’s
practice of giving abortion-rights advocates a pass when it
comes to suppressing the free-speech rights of their
5
opponents.”
These two cases did not stand alone. In one intervening
case, Scalia bitterly contended that the Court’s treatment of the
case should come as no surprise because “[w]hat is before us,
† Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
Copyright © 2016 by Daniel A. Farber.
1. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929).
2. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S.
357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
3. I will use the term “anti-abortion protests” to include all expressive
activities by anti-abortion advocates at abortion clinics or the homes of clinic
personnel, including picketing, leafleting, sidewalk counseling, and physical
interference with access.
4. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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after all, is a speech regulation directed against the opponents
of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the ‘ad hoc
nullification machine’ that the Court has set in motion to push
aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way
6
of that highly favored practice.” In a fourth abortion protest
case, Scalia lamented that the decision was “contrary to the
7
most fundamental principles of separation of powers.”
The majority did not respond in kind, but an observer
might have wondered whether Scalia’s vehement opposition to
abortion might not have been coloring his own view of the
cases. Ironically, given Scalia’s accusations of partiality in the
abortion protest cases, a 2013 statistical study concluded that
Scalia himself was far more likely to uphold the speech rights
of conservative speakers than liberal ones, though the study
8
has been subject to some methodological criticisms.
Taking a closer look at the abortion protest cases can shed
light on these disputes over judicial bias in First Amendment
cases. It can also shed light on two important aspects of Scalia’s
work: his rhetorical style, which regularly featured scathing
9
attacks on the motives or competence of other Justices; and his
insistence that his own decision-making adhered to rigorous,
10
objective methods of analysis.
In reexamining the four abortion protest cases, my goal is
not to decide whose views of the doctrinal issues were correct.
Rather, it is to assess whether Justice Scalia or the majority
stepped outside normal bounds in ways that might indicate
bias. At the risk of eliminating suspense about the results of
the inquiry, there seems to be more evidence of partiality on
the part of Justice Scalia in these cases than on the part of his
opponents. As a prelude to that analysis, I will begin by
6. Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 394.
8. See Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1, 3 (2015). As the title indicates, Pettys offers a critique of the study. He
argues that the results are suspect due to possible coding errors by the
authors of the study.
9. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A
Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 399–400 (2000). As other observers
put it, Justice Scalia “often seems to regard his colleagues with the disdain
that one would reserve for people considered unquestionably inferior in
intellectual or reasoning abilities.” DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E.
SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 208 (1996).
10. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Scalia Myth, NY REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 27,
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/27/the-scalia-myth/.
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sketching the basic First Amendment doctrines governing these
cases. I will then turn to an in-depth examination of the four
cases, and end with some brief thoughts about the implication
of the findings.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKDROP
The four abortion protest cases involve disputes over the
appropriate First Amendment standard and whether that
standard was correctly applied. A quick tour of the relevant
doctrine is necessary to understand these disputes. The crucial
doctrinal distinction is between regulations of speech unrelated
to content (the subject of Section A) and regulations based on
content (discussed in Section B).
A. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS OF EXPRESSION
The leading case governing content speech regulations is
11
United States v. O’Brien. The defendant had burned his draft
card in front of a large crowd as a protest against the Vietnam
War. He was convicted for willfully burning the card. The Court
upheld the conviction, reasoning that the government needed to
ensure that draft cards would be available when someone
needed to check a person’s draft status. In his opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Warren announced the following principle:
“[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
12
interest.” To rearrange the terms a bit, the O’Brien rule is
that a content-neutral regulation is valid if it is narrowly
tailored to a significant government interest. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan suggested an additional requirement,
that the regulation avoid “entirely preventing a ‘speaker’ from
reaching a significant audience with whom he could not
13
otherwise lawfully communicate.”

11. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. Id. at 377.
13. Id. at 388 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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A refinement of the O’Brien test was applied in Ward v.
14
Rock Against Racism. Because of a series of noisy concerts in
Central Park, New York City adopted an ordinance requiring
musicians to use city sound equipment and a government
sound technician. The Court applied the following three-part
test:
1. The regulation must be justified “without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.”
2. It must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.”
3. Finally, it must leave open “ample alternative channels
15
for communication of the information.”
The first two elements are derived from Warren’s opinion
in O’Brien, the third from Harlan’s concurrence. The Court
readily concluded that the government’s interest in noise
control was content-neutral, and that the regulation was a
reasonable method of keeping the noise level under control.
The Court emphasized in Ward that the “narrow tailoring”
requirement does not require the government to use the very
least restrictive alternative. A content-neutral regulation is not
invalid because there is some imaginable alternative that a
judge likes better. Rather, the government need only to show
that its regulatory interest “would be achieved less effectively”
16
without the regulation. “To be sure,” the Court added, “this
standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner of
regulation may burden substantially more speech than is
17
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”
Putting these remarks together, the upshot seems to be that a
regulation is too broad if it could achieve the government’s
purposes effectively while covering substantially less speech.
18
United States v. Grace illustrates how this approach is
applied to demonstrations in public spaces. Grace involved a
federal statute that prohibited leafleting or picketing on the
19
sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court.
The Court
observed that streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditionally
considered public forums where restrictions on expressive
14. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
15. Id. at 791.
16. Id. at 799.
17. Id.
18. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
19. See id. at 172, 175–76 (quoting the statute and discussing its
interpretation).
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conduct are limited to “reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations” that are content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and
20
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Applying this test, the Court said that a total ban on leafleting
or picketing was too broad in the absence of any evidence that
specific activities “in any way obstructed the sidewalks or
access to the building, threatened injury to any person or
property, or in any way interfered with the orderly
21
administration of the building or other parts of the grounds.”
B. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
The Court applies a much more stringent test to speech
restrictions that relate to content. The content distinction
found its first clear expression in Police Department of Chicago
22
v. Mosley. Mosley, a postal worker, frequently picketed a
Chicago high school with a sign accusing the school of having a
23
racial quota and practicing “black discrimination.” Seven
months after he had started picketing, the city enacted an
ordinance prohibiting picketing near any school just before,
24
after, or during school hours. A provision exempted “the
25
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”
The Mosley Court struck down the ordinance based on a broad
rule against content discrimination: “[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
26
or its content.” As the Court explained,
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which
issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is
an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. . . .
Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content
27
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 182.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
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The Court has not always been able to agree on what
28
constitutes content neutrality. In United States v. Eichman,
the Court considered a federal statute that prohibited physical
harm to the American flag except when disposing of worn or
29
soiled flags. The Court found the statute to be content-based
nevertheless. The government’s asserted interest—to preserve
the flag as a national symbol—was inevitably content-based,
since it “suppresses expression out of concern for its likely
30
communicative impact.” The four dissenters, led by Justice
Stevens, insisted that the law was content-neutral since it
31
applied regardless of the defendant’s intended message.
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify the
meaning of content discrimination, while indicating the
stringency of review applied to such restrictions. In Reed v.
32
Town of Gilbert, a town’s sign ordinance imposed stronger
restrictions on signs directing people to specific locations than
33
it did on some other signs, such as address signs. The Court
offered a two-pronged definition of content discrimination.
First, a law is content-based if the law “applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
34
expressed” or because of “its function or purpose.” Second, a
law is content-based if it was motivated by disagreement with
particular messages or cannot be justified without respect to
35
the content of some of speech it regulates. Under this test, a
law is content-based if it actually categorizes speakers based on
their messages or their reasons for speaking, if it was covertly
intended to suppress certain kinds of messages, or if it can only
be justified because much of the speech it regulates contain
particular messages.
Applying this test, the Court found it clear that the sign
ordinance was content-based, since it distinguished between
36
different types of signs based on their messages. That being
so, the sign ordinance could survive only if it furthered a
compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

496 U.S. 310 (1990).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 319.
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
Id. at 2225.
Id. at 2227.
Id.
Id.
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that end. The ordinance failed to survive this test. Reed was
decided after the abortion protest cases discussed in the next
section, so it is not directly relevant to Justice Scalia’s charge
that the Court was deviating from accepted First Amendment
doctrine. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the importance of the
content distinction and indicates some of the main
considerations in applying it.
II. THE ABORTION PROTEST CASES
Each of the four abortion protest cases involved
considerable factual complexity and multiple restrictions on
protests, as well as difficult doctrinal issues. A full discussion of
any one case would require far more space than is available
here. The discussion will thus be limited to the key points in
each case and consideration of possible evidence of bias.
A. JUDICIAL INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PROTESTERS
39

Madsen v. Women’s Health Center involved an injunction
against protesters who had violated an earlier, more limited
injunction. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
upheld a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street but struck down
40
some other aspects of the injunction. The operators of a
Florida abortion clinic initially obtained an injunction against
the defendants from interfering with public access to the clinic
41
or physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic.
When the first injunction proved ineffective, the operators
sought a broader injunction against the defendants, including
an injunction against harassing doctors and clinic workers in
42
their homes. The broader injunction, besides setting up the
buffer zone, prohibited loud noises and sound amplification
during surgical hours and prohibited the defendants from
physically approaching anyone seeking to use the clinic without
43
that person’s consent. The Court invalidated this “bubble”

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2231–32.
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
Id. at 757.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 759.
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provision as being broader than necessary to ensure access and
44
prevent intimidation.
The most basic question facing the Court was the
appropriate standard of review. The injunction itself did not
refer to the content of speech, so arguably the standard for
content-neutral regulations should apply. On the other hand,
given that the injunction was aimed only at specific speakers, it
presented a greater opportunity for content-based motivation
than a general law, arguably justifying strict scrutiny. Taking
into account these opposing arguments, the majority
compromised with an intermediate standard for review of
injunctions, asking whether “the challenged provisions of the
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
45
significant government interest.”
Justice Scalia argued that there was no real precedent for
46
the Court’s holding, and this seems to be correct. The case
that seemed to come closest was Carroll v. President of Princess
47
Anne, in which the Court said that an injunction against
speech “must be couched in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish
the
pin-pointed
objective
permitted
by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public
48
order.” There is indeed a difference between the language
used in Madsen and this standard—“narrowest terms” versus
“burden no more speech than necessary,” and perhaps more
significantly, “significant government interest” versus
“essential needs of the public order.” So Madsen might be
considered to dilute the Carroll formulation somewhat. On the
other hand, Carroll could hardly be considered to have
established a definitive standard for reviewing the substance of
speech injunctions, because this language was dictum. The
Carroll Court’s holding was based entirely on the procedural
flaws in the injunction proceeding and in particular on the
failure to allow the plaintiffs to argue for some narrowing of the
49
very sweeping injunction in the case. It was relevant to the
44. Id. at 764.
45. Id. at 766.
46. Id. at 799 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
48. Id. at 183.
49. As the Court explained:
We need not decide the thorny problem of whether, on the facts of this
case, an injunction against the announced rally could be justified. The
10-day order here must be set aside because of a basic infirmity in the
procedure by which it was obtained. It was issued ex parte, without
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decision that some narrowing might be required by the First
Amendment, but there was no reason for the Court to rule on
how much narrowing was required.
Thus, the Madsen Court could not have properly claimed to
be simply applying settled law. Still, the fact that the Court
had never previously ruled directly on the proper standard
means that there was no precedent in favor of Scalia’s position
either. And it does dispel his assertion that the Court had
departed far from past practice, since there was no relevant
50
past practice, only dictum.
Justice Scalia’s dissent devotes considerable attention to
the facts. He spent a great deal of time describing a video and
other evidence about the demonstrations in order to show that
51
the defendant’s conduct did not justify the second injunction.
For instance, he argued that there was no evidence to support
52
the finding that the original injunction had been violated. He
also argued that the trial court had improperly found some
other anti-abortion demonstrators to be acting “in concert” with
53
the defendants and therefore bound by the injunction.
The trouble with Scalia’s arguments was not that they
were wrong but that they were irrelevant. These issues simply
were not before the Court. In order to obtain review in the
Florida Supreme Court, the defendants had limited their claim
to an argument that the injunction was invalid on its face, and
they explicitly conceded for purposes of review that “a factual
54
basis exists to grant injunctive relief.” So the question of
whether there was a factual basis for the injunction was no
longer part of the case. Nor, as the majority pointed out, were
the possible claims of individuals who had been held to be
acting in concert with the defendants, because none of them
55
were parties. Thus, much of Scalia’s opinion was devoted to
legally irrelevant material.

notice to petitioners and without any effort, however informal, to
invite or permit their participation in the proceedings.
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180.
50. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 800.
51. Id. at 786–91 (videotape); 796–97 (evidence regarding individuals
acting “in concert”); 804–12 (testimony about defendant’s conduct).
52. Id. at 808.
53. Id. at 796–97.
54. Id. at 770.
55. Id. at 775–76.
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Perhaps the strongest sign that Justice Scalia was
emotionally overwrought by the case was his accusation that
the majority opinion reflected favoritism toward abortion
advocates. Recall that the majority opinion was written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a strong opponent of abortion rights.
So Scalia’s allegation of favoritism toward abortion providers
seems to fall flat.
This is not to say that the majority was necessarily right.
Perhaps, as Scalia claimed, the standard should have been
strict scrutiny, or perhaps, as Justice Stevens argued in a
separate opinion, it should have been even more lenient than
56
the Court’s standard. And the Court may or may not have
been right in its application of the test. But Scalia’s diatribe
against the Court seems to reflect more on his own emotional
predispositions than on the majority’s. There is simply no
evidence to believe that the Court was violating established
precedent or violating normal procedures, whereas Scalia
himself was at least guilty of the latter missteps by addressing
issues that were not properly before the Court.
The propriety of injunctions against anti-abortion
protesters returned to the Court a few years later in Schenck v.
57
Pro-Choice Network. The injunction in Schenck included two
key restrictions: (1) floating buffer zones requiring individuals
to stay fifteen feet away from those entering or leaving the
facility, and (2) a fixed buffer zone fifteen feet from all
58
entrances. Chief Justice Rehnquist once again delivered the
opinion of the Court. The bone of contention with Justice Scalia
involved the fixed buffer zone. Rehnquist found sufficient
evidence for the trial judge to conclude that the only way to
assure access was to move the demonstrators away from
doorways and other entrances, particularly since the
defendant’s harassment of police made it difficult for the police
to intervene on the basis of misconduct by individual
59
protesters.
Rejecting the argument that a simple injunction against
blocking physical access would be enough, Rehnquist found
sufficient basis for the judge to “conclude that some of the
defendants who were allowed within 5 to 10 feet of clinic

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 778–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
519 U.S. 357 (1997).
Id. at 366–67.
Id. 380–81.
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entrances would not merely engage in stationary, nonobstructive demonstrations but would continue to do what they
had done before: aggressively follow and crowd individuals
right up to the clinic door and refuse to move, or purposefully
mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to impede or
60
block the progress of cars.” The Court also found a basis for
excluding sidewalk counselors in the fixed buffer zone because
of evidence that many of them had been arrested multiple
61
times for harassment.
Justice Scalia’s angry dissent begins with a legal error,
citing a rule governing review of administrative agencies
instead of the contrary rule applying to review of judicial
62
judgments. The reasoning of his dissent, unfortunately, was
keyed to this incorrect standard. This may seem an obscure
technicality to the uninitiated, but it is a surprisingly
elementary legal mistake for an experienced appellate judge to
make.
Justice Scalia also excoriated the Court for considering the
interest in public safety in assessing the case, on the theory
that only the private interests of the plaintiff could be
63
considered. In Scalia’s view, the case only involved a trespass
on the abortion clinic’s property. Although the plaintiff also
made a state civil rights claim, Justice Scalia found it
incredible that anyone might think that blocking access to an
abortion clinic raised a civil rights issue, and he also contended
that the trial judge could not rely on public safety as the
64
justification for an injunction against trespass.
Justice Scalia went to particular lengths to rebut the
Court’s reliance on public safety as a justification for the
injunction. Only the state executive, he said, could bring a
65
claim based on public safety. As the Court pointed out, Justice
Scalia seemed to be confusing whether the plaintiffs had a
60. Id. at 381–82.
61. Id. at 384–85.
62. Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The difference is that a court can
only affirm an agency decision on the same argument the agency made, but it
can affirm a lower court on the basis of different reasons. The majority cites
the numerous precedents that deal with review of court orders. Id. at 384. As
to how basic this rule is, I can only say that I learned it in the first week of my
clerkship at a federal court of appeals.
63. Id. at 392–93.
64. Id. at 391.
65. Id. at 393–94. Given the ability of private plaintiffs to bring public
nuisance cases, Scalia’s claim seems dubious on this score.
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cause of action to protect public safety with whether, in
response to a First Amendment defense, they could invoke
public safety as a justification for the constitutionality of the
66
injunction. Procedurally, these are two very different issues,
and Scalia does nothing to explain why they should be treated
identically.
Scalia was clearly correct that the Court did not bend over
backwards to uphold the defendants’ First Amendment claims
in these cases, and he may have been right that it has done so
in some other First Amendment cases. But it seems odd to
accuse the Court of a grave misstep for judging a case
objectively in one case simply because it failed to do so in some
other cases. At the same time, as in the previous case, Scalia’s
opinion seems to reflect procedural confusion that is not, one
would hope, generally present in his opinions, and that could be
taken as a sign of emotional involvement in the cases.
B. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION PROTESTS
The two most recent cases on abortion protesters involve
statutory rather than injunctive restrictions. In Hill v.
67
Colorado, a state law prohibited certain conduct within a
hundred feet of a healthcare facility: knowingly intruding
within eight feet of another person to pass out a leaflet, display
68
a sign, or engage in “oral protest, education, or counseling.”
The majority opinion this time was written by Justice Stevens,
not by Rehnquist, although Rehnquist joined the opinion.
Justice Stevens concluded that the content-neutral test applied,
that the government had a significant interest in protecting
69
individuals using the clinic from unwanted speech, and that
70
the restriction was narrowly tailored to that end. Justice
Stevens argued that it would be difficult to apply a rule
banning “harassment,” and that because of the subjective

66. Id. at 396 n.7. There seems to be authority contrary to Scalia’s
position even in terms of the plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief, let alone in
terms of rebutting a First Amendment defense. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the
Court said: “The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of standing to
obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may assert
the interests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief.”
405 U.S. 727, 740 n.15 (1972).
67. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
68. Id. at 705.
69. Id. at 718.
70. Id. at 726–31.
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nature of harassment, such a rule would offer less guidance to
71
speakers than a broader, prophylactic rule.
Justice Scalia again dissented. He had “no doubt that this
regulation would be deemed content-based in an instant if the
case before us involved antiwar protesters, or union members
seeking to ‘educate’ the public about the reasons for their
72
strike.” The majority’s response was that the law’s reference
to “oral protest, education, or counseling” was simply designed
to eliminate casual conversations that would not interfere with
73
building access. Rather than being aimed at the speaker’s
message, the majority seemed to think that “oral protest,
education, or counseling” really was aimed at buttonholing
listeners, a type of behavior that might be identified visually
with no knowledge of the speaker’s message.
Today, I suspect, Scalia’s argument about the standard of
review might prevail. As understood today, the requirement of
content neutrality might require the state to ban even asking a
person for the time if it wanted to prevent blatant verbal
harassment. But even so, this would not affect the other
aspects of the statute governing leafleting and picketing, which
are clearly content-neutral.
Justice Scalia also argued at length that the statute placed
a heavy burden on the activities of sidewalk anti-abortion
counselors. He may well have been right, but if the contentneutral test applies, the validity of the law must be judged on
its face, not on the basis of the particular needs of a specific
74
group of speakers.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the difference between
the majority and the dissent is found in Justice Scalia’s
dismissal of the rationale that “the statute aims to protect
distraught women who are embarrassed, vexed, or harassed as
75
they attempt to enter abortion clinics.” “If these are
punishable acts,” he continued “they should be prohibited in
76
those terms.” Note the “if”—Scalia apparently wanted to
reserve the question of whether harassment of people trying to
use a healthcare facility is a valid government concern. The
majority clearly does think that harassment is a genuine
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 729.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 779–91.
Id. at 776.
Id.
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problem and that a prohibition phrased in terms of
“harassment” would neither be workable (because of problems
of proof) nor desirable (because it would fail to give speakers
notice of when they cross the line of illegality). Scalia seems
unable to grasp how anyone could hold that view.
It is difficult to assess Scalia’s claim that the Court would
have ruled differently in a case that did not involve abortion
protests. Suppose, for instance, that the tables had been
turned. Imagine that pro-choice protesters outside religiously
affiliated hospitals were harassing people entering these
hospitals because of the hospitals’ refusal to provide abortions.
Would the majority then have struck down a law creating a
buffer zone? Would Justice Scalia have been so dismissive of
the reasons for the regulation? It seems impossible to know.
Justice Scalia was equally incensed about the fourth of the
abortion protests cases, despite the fact that the protestors won
77
the case. In McCullen v. Coakley, a Massachusetts law banned
knowingly standing on a sidewalk or street within thirty-five
feet of any place, other than a hospital, where abortions were
performed. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
struck down the law. It found the law to be content-neutral but
then
pointed
to
several
possible,
less-burdensome
78
alternatives.
Once again, Justice Scalia was incensed, saying that there
is an “entirely separate, abridged edition of the First
79
Amendment applicable to speech against abortion.” He faulted
the Court for unnecessarily determining that the law was not
content-based, which he said was gratuitous since the statute
80
failed even the content-neutral test. He also said that it
“blinks reality to say, as the majority does, that a blanket
prohibition on the use of streets and sidewalks where speech on
only one politically controversial topic is likely to occur—and
where that speech can most effectively be communicated—is
81
not content-based.” Perhaps so, but the Court had regularly
blinked reality in past cases, as by finding in a landmark case
77. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
78. Id. at 2530, 2537–41.
79. Id. at 2541.
80. Id. at 2541–42. The Court responded that this was not a departure
from normal process and that in any event it could not determine whether
less-intrusive alternatives were possible without deciding that they would be
at least arguably constitutional themselves. Id. at 2530.
81. Id. at 2543.

2016]

PLAYING FAVORITES?

37

that a law against burning draft cards was not aimed at the
draft opponents who were the only ones engaging in this
82
conduct. Scalia also said that the law was content-based
because of the possibility that clinic employees, who were
exempt from the restriction, might encourage women to get
83
abortions, though this seems quite speculative as a basis for
finding legislation to be content-based. Again, whatever the
merits of Scalia’s argument, his rhetoric seems overwrought
since the target of his attack is an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, who is not a defender of abortion. Indeed, one scholar
astutely suggests that the Court might well have been accused
of bending the normally very lenient standard for narrow
tailoring, warping its application against the government and
84
in favor of the abortion protesters.
It is difficult to assess Scalia’s claim of bias since he points
to no comparable non-abortion case. Suppose that Congress
passed a law forbidding anyone from standing within thirty
feet of a military recruiting office, with an exemption for the
military recruiters themselves. Would the Court have held this
law to be content-neutral and suggested some other, less
restrictive alternatives? We cannot know, but it seems
reasonably likely that it would have done so. Would Scalia have
considered such a law content-based and found it invalid
because of its impact on people trying to persuade potential
recruits to avoid military service? There is, once again, no way
of knowing, although Scalia seems utterly confident of how
such hypothetical cases would be resolved (consistently by him,
inconsistently by the majority).
CONCLUSION
In these cases involving abortion protesters, Justice Scalia
accused the Court of ignoring well-established law in the
interest of suppressing speakers with whom the majority
disagreed. That was a serious accusation. It involved not only
violation of the general judicial duty of impartiality and
fairness toward all litigants, but also of the First Amendment’s
own imperative of neutrality toward opposing viewpoints.

82. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
83. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2547 (2014).
84. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination
in McCullen v. Coakley, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 239–40 (2015).
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A close examination of the relevant cases suggests little
support for this accusation, although it is never possible to say
with confidence that a case was completely unaffected by the
biases or ideologies of the judges. Indeed, in three of the cases,
the charge of favoritism toward abortion advocates was not
terribly plausible to begin with, given that three opinions were
written by Justices who opposed abortion rights (and the fourth
was joined by one of those Justices). Rather, examination of the
cases suggests that Scalia’s own legal analysis may have been
warped by his passionate endorsement of the protesters’ views.
His sense of identification with the protestors may also have
contributed to his attacks on the majority’s motives. In short,
his own adherence to objective legal reasoning may have been
weaker than he imagined, and that of his opponents stronger
than he thought.
Four cases involving a highly contentious issue do not
provide a firm basis for drawing generalizations about a threedecade judicial career. Yet, in a sense, it was Scalia himself
who identified these cases as tests of judicial integrity and
impartiality through the accusations he made against the
majority. It is telling, then, that these accusations fell flat and
to some extent may have rebounded against him. Like all of us,
Justice Scalia might have done well to ask himself about the
beam in his own eye before addressing the motes in the eyes of
85
others. But this kind of self-reflection does not seem to have
been a feature of his character.

85. “And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but
considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?” Matthew 7:3 (King James).

